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Almost Present at the Creation: A Personal Perspective of a Continuing
Journey
by Stephen S loan
Continuity and Change in International Terrorism
The following article represents more than an opportunity to address areas of past,
current, and future concern among those who are involved in understanding the causes,
dynamics, and outcomes of international terrorism. It provides the author with the
opportunity to also engage in a personal assessment of the evolution of modern terrorism.
Certainly in the aftermath of 9/11 those concerns have been amplified as both the United
States and the international community are confronted with what can be regarded to be a
fundamental assault on the civil order. But, while the scale of the carnage on that terrible
day initiated what may be the beginning of a new stage in terrorists' tactics and strategies,
modern terrorism has been with us for over 40 years. While a new generation of academic
specialists in terrorism will hopefully be available to address the new challenges, and
while government officials at all levels now recognize that terrorism is not only what
happens to other people in other countries, the current debates that have been generated
by the tragedies at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania,
should not obscure the fact that modern terrorism has challenged both academics and
governments for over three decades. Consequently, while there are always new lessons to
be learned, one can also draw from past experiences to address present and future threats.
This article addresses the continuity and change that has characterized the developments
of modern terrorism from the perspective of an individual who has been involved in the
conduct of research, the operational aspects of, and the policy dimensions related to
terrorism. The article is not intended to be a reminiscence solely of what happened, but
hopefully can help place in a broader context the quest by those who seek to understand
and address what for all intents and purposes is a form of protracted conflict and warfare.
It is a personal account; but an account that looks at the past as a means to assist a new
generation that must counter a form of violence that may be as old as recorded history,
but has evolved with murderous efficiency through the perversion of the ideals of the
French Revolution under Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety, the rise of the
modern totalitarian state, and now with a new set of actors who have declared a global
war against all.1
From Political Violence to Terrorism
One did not specialize in terrorism as a field of study when I entered graduate school in
1960. Within the social sciences, terrorism was addressed as an aspect of understanding
revolution and totalitarianism. In my discipline, political science, while there were studies
on warfare we were still a few years away from systematically studying political violence
much less terrorism. My introduction to political violence would take place not within an
academic setting but in the field. As a student of comparative government at New York
University, I developed a Southeast Asian area specialization with a focus on the
Republic of Indonesia. In 1965, I went to Jakarta to engage in research on student
indoctrination programs under the Sukarno regime. At that time, there were no exchange
scholarships since relations between President Sukarno and Washington were very
strained. I consequently went with an ordinary tourist visa and the optimism and spirit of
adventure that is often to be found in graduate students. I was, to paraphrase a Chinese
curse and blessing, "living in interesting times." For President Sukarno was playing a very
dangerous game of seeking to balance off the Islamic parties, the minority Christian
parties, the nationalists, and the communist party. Furthermore, the communists, through
their superior organization and recruitment skills, were mobilizing the peasantry who
were suffering profound economic deprivation. In addition, the president had to contend
with a military whose loyalty was increasingly being divided between the left (especially
the Air Force) and the right, generals, and other senior officers, including those who had
successfully defeated the communist during the abortive uprising in Madiun in 1948. 
In this tense environment I had my real world introduction to political violence on the
morning of 1 October 1965. For, while Jakarta slept on the previous evening, there was
an attempted coup. That morning I had a long scheduled appointment with the communist
front delegate who was involved in the indoctrination program. On my way to his office I
saw unknown troops guarding the telecommunication building and when I arrived at the
delegate's office he had left. In an hour different rumors surrounding a coup attempt
surfaced. In the next weeks the military, who had lost six senior generals at the inception
of the coup, indirectly challenged President Sukarno's "balancing act" by supporting the
various national and religious groups that were opposed to the Communist Party (PKI).
But it was really the longer-term reaction to the politics in the capitol city that brought the
reality of violence and politics home to me. In the reaction that followed, fuelled by
religious fervor, anti-Chinese sentiment, mystical beliefs, and personal revenge, there was
massive carnage in the countryside. The full magnitude may never be known, but over
500,000 people were killed. I will always remember the burning of villages by otherwise
"peaceful" Balinese who said they were involved in the violence because the people of
the village "were devils." Such was my introduction into primal fears and primal
behavior.2
On my way home I stopped in Thailand and through a friend was offered a position
related to analyzing patterns of maritime infiltration in the Gulf of Tonkin. The position
was something out of an adventure movie. I was to have my own crew and engage in
what was then a junk identification program aimed at ascertaining maritime patterns of
infiltration routes in South Vietnam. I did not take this offer or another more
"conventional" program associated with surveying attitudes toward a growing insurgency
in Northeast Thailand. In retrospect, I wonder what my life would have been like if I took
either positions. But at the time, among things, I recognized that if I returned to Southeast
Asia in either of those capacities it was highly unlikely that I would ever complete my
studies. Nevertheless, those offers stimulated my long-term academic interest in what has
been variously called unconventional warfare, insurgency, low-intensity conflict,
operations other than war, and now asymmetric warfare. That interest continues to this
day in the post-Cold War period.3 When I returned home I took a position in the
Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, assuming that I would be
there for a few years and then return to either New York City or another large urban area.
I wonder where the time went? I just retired after 38 years on the faculty.
During my first years at the university my continued and growing focus on political
violence was in part an aspect of my teaching a course on Southeast Asian politics as the
growing debate over US involvement that led to both political and physical conflict
throughout the nation and on various campuses including my own. As a result, I began to
also develop a course on comparative political violence where I utilized the pioneering
studies of James C. Davies, Ted Robert Gurr, and others.4 Indeed, one of my first
professional papers, "The Functionality of Violence in the New States of Asia and
Africa," sought to address the roles of violence in the political life of the then newly
independent countries. That quest remains today.5
My interest in these areas was further enhanced by acceptance of a Fulbright
Professorship at Tribhuvan University in Nepal in 1972-73. There the demands for
democratic or revolutionary change in a traditional society were manifested by both
protest and at times violence. Ironically, I would revisit the Kingdom in 1995 with my
son on vacation; but the vacation was short-lived as I became involved in discussing
alternatives to a growing Maoist insurgency with Nepali officials; an insurgency that
continues today. 
My change in focus to directly study terrorism, much as in the past, was based on my
experience in the field. In 1974, I went to Israel with my wife and acted as a freelance
journalist for the largest paper in our state, The Daily Oklahoman. I wrote impressionistic
articles which were published in an eight-part series, but they did not relate to what would
become my major interest in the years to come - the study of terrorism.6 While I cannot
say what directly led me to the study, I recall that Israel, like the rest of the world, was
trying to come to grips with a new threat they were facing - terrorism in the form of
skyjackings in the 1960s which ultimately seized the world's attention with the Munich
Massacre of 1972. What was apparent, however, was, despite the shock and concern,
there was little in the study of terrorism as a contemporary field of systematic academic
inquiry.
Therefore, when I returned to campus I began to teach and engage in research on what
Brian Jenkins referred to as A New Mode of Conflict, a conflict both academics and
government officials were beginning to react to.7 I therefore engaged in activities that
continue to this day. First, I developed and initiated a graduate course on terrorism under
the heading of Problems in Comparative Politics. It would take time before the topic was
"officially recognized" under the heading of International Terrorism. (Such is the often
conservative and glacial movement of academic programs to address new areas of
concern.) I believe it was the first course conducted and then listed in a catalogue of an
American university. I was most fortunate to have a seminar of outstanding senior and
graduate students, who were willing to explore a new area of inquiry; students who were
not solely concerned with repeating and refining the existing conventional wisdom, but
who were willing to take risks in developing an interest in a field that did not exist as a
field within the discipline of political science. Secondly, I wished to seek to identify the
salient characteristics of contemporary terrorism that differentiated it from the terrorism
of the past. Thirdly, I sought to engage in a comparative study of incidents of terrorism to
identify patterns of terrorist strategies, tactics, and their implications in formulating
counter-terrorism policies. In one of my early studies, it became readily apparent that,
while the causes of terrorism in many cases were motivated by deeply embedded hatreds
based on such factors as ethnic and religious animosities, modern terrorism was
functionally different from the acts that preceded it. That is, contemporary terrorism was
the product of two revolutions: one in transportation and one in communication. For, with
the introduction of commercial jet aircraft in the late 1950s and early 1960s, terrorists
could literally strike global targets of opportunity in a matter of hours. Moreover, with the
advent of television the terrorists could spread their message of intimidation and "armed
propaganda" to a mass audience undreamed of by the most dedicated predecessors. In a
very real sense, the world was now confronted with what I called "non-territorial
terrorism" (NTT) - a form of terrorism not confined to a clearly delineated area.8
Unfortunately, the events of 11 September refined it with terrible consequences, since
those who engaged in NTT had the capacity to become low-intensity inter-continental
missile delivery systems.
Whether they were using a plane to transport them to a distant field of operations,
whether they were skyjacking aircraft to make demands on governments, or whether, as
in the case of 9/11, using the aircraft as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the
terrorist initiated a new age in a long history of carnage. While governments, military and
police, security and intelligence agencies still operated within the confines of geographic,
legalistic, and jurisdictional boundaries, the terrorist had no limitations in what was to
become a global battlefield. Moreover, governments could not employ traditional
counter-insurgency doctrine and measures that could be employed when terrorism was
primarily viewed to be one aspect of a territorially based insurgency. Neither the "hearts
and mind approach" to win over a population or a "systems approach" to strengthen the
coercive capability of the government could work when those engaged in NTT would
often select targets of opportunity thousands away from a disputed strike zone or were
motivated to act on the basis of real and perceived forms of injustice that often took place
long before the terrorist was born. While military, police, and security forces were still
largely mired in a two dimensional field of operations, the terrorist was in effect
practising what could be called a form of low-intensity warfare using the aerospace as the
medium to initiate their attacks. The multidimensional aspects of today's terrorism still
enables the terrorist to seize the initiative from land bound governments, even when they
seek to use modern aircraft and cruise missiles as a means of combatting the terrorist.
Those who practice NTT also engage in what is now called asymmetric warfare. They
could employ an indirect approach to avoid a direct confrontation with a superior military
power. Furthermore, they could both "utilize and neutralize the technology" of industrial
and now the post-industrial societies.9 Through their resort to seizing modern aircraft to
their acquisition of hand-held missiles and other stand off weapons, terrorists served
notice that even if they held the most traditional values they were not averse to engaging
in technological innovation to achieve their goals. This willingness to innovate
unfortunately has accelerated as a result of the dissemination of information on modern
weapons of mass destruction and the utilization of a very powerful instrument that did not
exist when the monograph was written - the internet. The terrorists quickly recognized
that modern societies offered them so many vulnerable targets that could have a profound
impact on the political, economic, and social order. It was one thing to engage in the
systematic murder of village officials in an insurgency - the results in a protracted war
could be effective. But, it was another to assault what is now called "the critical
infrastructure" of a post-industrial state where the destruction of data bases might even be
more harmful than the industrial installations of a country. There were warnings of how
technological breakdown, even if it was not purposeful, could bring a large urban area to
its knees - the blackout in New York City in 1960. I shared the concern that "techno-
terrorists" would intentionally attack the crucial soft under belly of a modern
technologically advanced and now an information dependent state.
The monograph also addressed the fact that both individually and collectively the
governments in the 1970s were not formulating or initiating consistent and effective
counter-terrorism policies. Admittedly, there has been a painful learning curve since it
was written, but the lessons learned have often not kept up with terrorist innovations in
tactics, strategies, and capabilities.
I owe a great deal to the seniors and graduate students that took my first seminars on
terrorism and in effect became "the working group on international terrorism" at the
University of Oklahoma. They, under my direction and with the outstanding assistance of
a then PhD candidate, Richard Kearney, who is now a distinguished professor of public
administration, engaged in a systematic study of incidents of terrorism to ascertain
patterns of terrorist tactics, strategies, and the government responses to these early acts of
violence. I developed a "parameter sheet of non-territorial terrorism." Using one early
chronology of the Rand Corporation and open sources - especially The New York Times
and The Times of London - the students collected data that would be published by The
Daily Oklahoman and then disseminated internationally through The New York Times
Company to major papers internationally instead of appearing in an academic journal.10
In part, this was a manifestation of the fact that public concern surpassed that of an
academic community that did not recognize that the study of terrorism was more than a
"problem area," or a subject for long-term inquiry. Furthermore, there were not yet
academic journals that specialized in the study of terrorism. 
That would be remedied by the establishment of the journal, Terrorism, and another,
Conflict, which have now been combined. My articles would be published in their early
issues.11 It is not the intention of this article to provide in detail the comparative findings
of the early articles. But, they do reflect a historical snapshot of what was regarded to be
significant in establishing a research agenda and developing the operational art and policy
alternatives that were yet to be developed in the early days of terrorism study. Some of
the snapshots were as follows.
The initial study analyzed 111 incidents which were expanded to 169. The majority
involved kidnapping, armed attack, and skyjacking. We did not focus on the most
common type of incident, the bombing, since we were interested in how authorities
responded after an attack. The focus was also a manifestation of the concerns of
governments at the time over hostage-taking and skyjacking that were not only a major
threat but seizing the world's headlines with regularity. What was of particular interest to
me, not only in regards to the initial findings but in the development of long-term
concerns, was the fact that the majority of the attacks in the initial study consisted of from
two to five members and in the expanded version, from two to eight.12 These conclusions
made me recognize that since terrorists had an enormous choice of targets and worked in
small, hard-to-detect cellular organizations, it would be very difficult to counter them by
relying on standard patrols and physical security measures. Therefore, I recognized the
vital role of intelligence in identifying and apprehending the terrorists before they went
"tactical," that is began to engage in the operational phase of their missions. The central
role of intelligence in combatting terrorism was affirmed when I attended two of the
Bowdoin Seminars on Teaching Intelligence and other programs sponsored by the
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence of the National Strategy Information Center.
These seminars brought together a pioneering group of academics and intelligence
officials that were seeking to develop an understanding of the key role of intelligence in
national security by developing courses, books, and articles that could promote
intelligence as a field of scholarly inquiry. The programs not only enabled me to develop
my capabilities to teach courses in the area, but helped me to refine my ability to apply an
understanding of the elements of intelligence as a vital aspect of counter-terrorism
measures, capabilities, programs, and policies.
What was of special interest to us in the early studies were the findings that "terrorists
usually do not comply with the time limits they have imposed on authorities in meeting
their demands [and] in the event . . . involving a negotiation process between terrorists
and authorities in which the hostages' lives hang in the balance, the first three days are
critical for hostages, for 87% of the hostage deaths occurred in incidents lasting three
days or less."13 This conclusion seemed to affirm the growing view that by training
effective hostage negotiators the authorities could resolve most incidents peacefully. This
view was successfully operationalized by the development of hostage negotiation
techniques and their utilization by such remarkable law enforcement personnel as Harvey
Scholsberg and Frank Boltz of the New York Police Department.14 The key role of
negotiation has been accepted in dealing with incidents ranging from domestic disputes to
armed robberies and terrorist hostage taking. But as we know today, there are serious
questions whether forces should only be used as a last resort in the face of terrorists who
immediately kill at the inception of, and during, an attack.
In its conclusion, the study noted that "cooperation among various terrorist groups and
individual members was increasing," a precursor that, even if there is not a tightly
controlled, highly centralized network, the level of cooperation represents a real challenge
to authorities. This challenge has been confirmed by the ability of al-Qaeda to coordinate
and conduct multiple global attacks. Perhaps even more vexing was the fact that "few
nation-states have a coherent and consistent policy in dealing with terrorism."15 This
conclusion unfortunately has validity today as the United States and the international
community still grapples with developing concerted policies to prevent or respond to
contemporary terrorism. 
Learning to Direct in the Theatre of the Obscene
As in the case of my earlier work circumstances, other than my academic specialization
provided the incentive for major changes in my research on terrorism. I am fortunate to be
married to Dr. Roberta Raider Sloan who is now Chair and Artistic Director of the
University of Central Florida Conservatory and Theatre. Throughout her career one of her
major areas of teaching, directing, and performing, is in the art of improvisational theatre.
Perhaps it was in part because of Brian Jenkins often quoted remark that "terrorism is a
form of theatre aimed at the people watching" that I began to draw on my wife's
outstanding talent to employ the techniques of improvisational theatre to simulate acts of
terrorism. As a result, starting on 22 September 1976, I conducted my first exercise using
members of my terrorist class to test the ability of the University of Oklahoma Police
Department to respond to a hostage-taking involving a terrorist group. This was followed
on 11-12 November with a more ambitious exercise, including a skyjacking of an
executive aircraft, conducted at the university airport with the Norman Police
Department. The exercise was part of a program entitled International Terrorism
Conference and Simulation, which brought together individuals from the governmental
sector from both the United States and overseas who were seeking to address the
dynamics of a still relatively new threat. Many of them were or would become senior
officials and leading authorities in their field who I have had the pleasure of working with
since those cold November days.
Since that time I have conducted more than 15 exercises involving everything from the
seizure of an oil refinery, engaging in a skyjacking of a fully loaded operational jet of a
major airline, seizing marine embassy guards before the Iran hostage-taking, training for
the Canal Protection Division of the Panama Canal Commission, and a 24-hour exercise
in Berlin against the Berlin Brigade. (I later learned that one of my students, Terry
Griswold, who was instrumental in arranging the exercise, was then commander of the
US Army counter-terrorism detachment in Berlin. At the time their existence was
classified.) Members of the detachment played the role of my terrorists. They were clearly
one of the best adversary forces I have worked with over the years. The experiences
acquired in developing, conducting, and evaluating the exercise were published in my
Simulating Terrorism.16 I have been very pleased to see the simulation technique adopted
by both domestic and foreign police and military forces over the years - a number of
which I have worked with. I am still involved in conducting exercise, but a number of
them now deal with "crisis management," for corporations and other institutions.
Moreover, my latest exercises stress the development of proactive measures through the
use of an effective count-terrorism intelligence process.
From Reaction to Preemption
As a result of my activities, I was offered the position of Senior Research Fellow at the
Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) at the United States
Air Force University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In that capacity, I supervised
the research of students at the War College who were responsible for engaging in studies
on terrorism for the major command. Furthermore, I continued to help to develop,
conduct, and evaluate courses for the military related to preventing, deterring, and
responding to threats and acts of terrorism.17 In addition, I had a splendid opportunity to
concentrate on my research.
It was in the research arena where some of my most rewarding work took place, since
aside from wishing to more fully understand the tactics and strategies of terrorists and the
means to counter them, I was especially interested in assessing the still emerging field of
counter-terrorism doctrine and policy. It was here where I received an interesting lesson
in the danger of moving beyond the conventional wisdom. One of my studies at CADRE,
Beating International Terrorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment,
almost never saw the publishable light of day.18 The study called for development of
preemptive doctrine, forces, capabilities, and target selection to take the offensive against
terrorist groups and their state sponsors. However, at the time for both the military and
the civilian sector combatting terrorism was essentially reactive in nature. Thus, there
were, for example, two separate categories under the heading of terrorism counteraction
by the military. The first was anti-terrorism, "defensive measures taken to reduce
vulnerability to terrorist attack," and the second was counter-terrorism, "offensive
measures taken to respond to a terrorist act."19 I raised the question of how one could
engage in the contradictory position of taking an offensive measure when one is
responding to terrorism and therefore suggested the need for a third category, terrorism
preemption, which in the fullest sense, would be offensive in nature. The study almost did
not survive security and policy review. (I believe the issue was one of policy since it was
meant for public distribution and relied on open source material.)
Fortunately, my commander, Colonel Don Stephens, USAF, who had a very strong
commitment to academic freedom, came to my defence and the study was published and
then later revised in April 2000.20 By that time the use of preemptive measures was
slowly being legitimized officially.
Upon completion of my assignment, I headed a counter-terrorism practice as part of an
intelligence systems practice for a large consultant firm in Washington, DC. In that
capacity I worked closely with agencies involved in combatting terrorism. This one-year
in Washington provided me with a level of experience in dealing with the federal
bureaucracy and particularly the intelligence community that could not be acquired in
academia.
Terrorism Comes Home
When I returned to Oklahoma I continued my work, but there was to be an event that
would again direct my energies; however, in this case, even my long-term concern about
the United States and terrorism, on the state and local level, could not prepare me for
what I witnessed.21 As in the case of other aspects of my journey, it was grounded in
events that I would have hardly believed could become a reality. The initial warning that
international terrorism had come home in full force was the bombing of the World Trade
Center in February 1993. But while the shock waves spread through the country, there
was still a degree of insularity within the interior of the country, as people still could not
accept that terrorism could happen in the perceived shelter of the communities in the so-
called "heartland." That self-deception would give way to a grim reality - that no area was
immune to terrorism.
On 19 April 1995, I was preparing to take my daughter Maya to our doctor in downtown
Oklahoma City. As I prepared to leave our house, it was rocked by an explosion. My
neighbor thought it was a sonic boom and I a gas explosion at the site of an old, deserted
hospital. 
Consequently, I started to drive downtown, but as I saw the chaos I immediately returned,
told my daughter to call my wife to say that we were all right and that I was heading back
to the site of the explosion. When I saw the Murrah Building it reminded me of the way
the US Embassy in Lebanon looked after it was attacked. Thus, from the inception of the
tragedy - only 14 blocks from my house - I realized that terrorism had almost literally
come home.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the remarkable capability of a people to
come together as a community and a nation in the wake of such a tragedy. It is also
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the challenges I faced, particularly in having
over 200 interviews on site and at our local network affiliate from the print and electronic
media from around the world in the weeks that followed. Having addressed the problem
of media coverage and been involved in training Department of Defence public affairs
officers from all the services to deal with terrorism coverage, I found myself involved in
the continuous struggle between the media and the authorities.22 I still use the "lessons"
learned in my classes. But I must say that I was confronted with yet a more personal test
when I was asked by the Timothy McVey defence team to engage in research for them.
For over 25 years I had sought to combat terrorism and now I was asked to work on
behalf of an individual who, up to that time, had committed the most costly terrorist act
on US soil. I reluctantly took on the assignment because of my long-held commitment to
civil liberties and recognition that the real with for a democratic system is how it provides
due process for even those who have engaged in a most heinous crime.
As a result of the bombing, I continued to focus on international terrorism, but I
increasingly sought to address the relationship between international and domestic
terrorism, what my friend and colleague, the late John O'Neill, called "seamless
terrorism."23 My initial work was at the start both emotional and academic in nature. On
the emotional level, the bombing had particular salience since it happened in my own
community. While I was fortunate in not knowing any of the 168 victims directly, my
daughter and friends experienced more personal loss. I also shared the view that an
appropriate memorial be built and I urge the readers to see it if they come to Oklahoma
City. But beyond that I shared the view that there was a need for a living memorial that
would seek among things to engage in research on the causes, dynamics, outcomes, and
responses to terrorism. I therefore was on the steering committee that helped to establish
the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). The Institute has placed
emphasis on funding projects related to training first responders by evaluating proposals
and providing funding through the National Institutes of Justice of the Department of
Justice. It is their hope that the lessons acquired from the Murrah Building, "The
Oklahoma Standard," will help other communities meet the challenges of future
incidents, but I also hope, as their first Research Fellow, that the Institute will
increasingly promote research and address policy issues associated with one of its initial
objectives - the prevention of terrorism.
As a result of my continuing concerns over developing capabilities to address terrorism
preparedness on the state and local level, I became involved in a number of conferences
and workshops where I emphasized the need to encourage what I call "community crisis
management," which involved not only the police, the fire service, and health care
professionals, but the community itself. This is as it should be for to paraphrase the late
Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill - "All terrorism is local."24 
The events of 9/11 have led to accelerated activities on my part as well as those of my
colleagues in the field - both young and old timers. I have for my part, been involved in
our state's Homeland Security Task Force where I have emphasized the need to develop
counter-terrorism intelligence capabilities on the state and local levels, and more
meaningful and mutual cooperation at the federal level. In pursuing these objectives, I
have conducted workshops with state and local police and sheriffs to develop their
counter-terrorism collection and analysis capabilities.25 In addition, I have entered into
discussion concerning the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security. I
was concerned that if that department was established, would it promote effective
coordination or add another layer of bureaucratic bloat at a time when there is a need for
the necessary degree of flexibility to engage those who are practising asymmetric
warfare? It remains to be seen if the new organizational format negate the possibility of
developing the necessary organizational doctrine that emulates that of the terrorists?26
Will the US have the initiative to establish small, highly innovative entities that are
flexible in engaging in both reactive and preemptive operations ranging from
psychological warfare, information operations, apprehension of terrorists, and, when
necessary, the use of highly selective force to counter terrorists? Admittedly, there are
hard questions related to how to keep such entities accountable for their acts. There are
lessons that still must be learned from the Iran-Contra scandal.27
Entering the Uncharted Waters of Techno-Terrorism:
The Need for Mentoring
When I look back, there has been one transformation in the field of terrorism studies that
is related to the fundamental changes we now see powered by the internet; a revolution
where cyber-space is a major new battlefield in the war against terrorism. When I
consider my academic career started with index cards, then progressed to yellow pads and
the typewriter, typing paper, and carbons, like others of an older generation, I have had to
make an adjustment to new realities. Furthermore, research methodologies, which in the
past used primitive computers and card sorters, have been replaced by expert systems,
artificial intelligence, and a variety of research tools undreamed of in the past. Confronted
with this reality an older generation of terrorist specialist has faced the daunting task of
seeking to educate and be educated by a new generation of specialist; a generation that
came of age in the information revolution, along unfortunately with the new generation of
terrorists. On a personal level I have learned a great deal from my students, but there is
still no substitute for analysis based on experience. It is unfortunate that, with some
notable exceptions, there are still not enough institutions of higher education that focus
on systematically educating and training students in terrorism studies. While the events of
9/11 have stimulated the growth of new programs, the academic community still responds
slowly to what they might regard to be a short-term area of inquiry but in reality is and
will be, a long-term challenge that educators at all levels must face. Unfortunately,
terrorism is still not viewed as being in the "mainstream" of political science and there
remains a gap that must be filled for a new generation to be capable of meeting a new and
enduring threat.
CONCLUSION:
LOOKING BACKWARDS AND LOOKING FORWARD
As one who was "almost present at the creation" in the field of terrorism teaching,
research, and application, I have learned the danger of attempting to predict through the
dark crystal ball that seeks to penetrate the clandestine landscape of terrorism. Certainly,
the dangers of weapons of mass destruction have been with us for quite awhile, but there
is finally a belated recognition that there are those terrorists who have the capability to
develop or accrue modern weapons in acts or a campaign of mass terrorism. Moreover, it
is clear that there are those who, motivated by fundamentalist beliefs, are not concerned
about public opinion and are willing to engage in a war against all through coordinated
attacks, and yet maintain their security in the vacuum of cyber space. In addition, they can
now spread their message of fear and intimidation through the practice of "netwar," which
can also promote virtual terrorism where perception, not actions, can bring fear to a mass
audience. Moreover, they are now forging marriages of convenience with criminals and
apolitical terrorists who are motivated by financial gain. They may not all be the "true
believers" of the past, but they can be just as murderous.
In meeting the new threats, not only governments but also the corporate and private
security, must meet the challenge. But there is a downside. Will the privatization of
public violence "lead to the creation of new mercenaries who will be equally at home in
conducting terrorism and counter-terrorism operations?" Moreover, with the development
of new technologies, will we witness the emergence of a surveillance society where an
individual's shrinking private zone will be open to governmental and corporate incursion?
Despite these concerns, one can still hope that men and women of good faith and their
respective governments will address both the root causes and present and future threats of
terrorism.
Admittedly, it is a hope from an individual who still retains more than a little of the
idealism he had when he started his journey as a young graduate student. It is tempered by
the recognition of the reality that the threat not only remains, but has increased in
magnitude.
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